JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10493
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Comments
DATE : 1/28/1962
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/500,097

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF TRAN VAN LY ON THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 25 JANUARY 1962

REFERENCES IN 18750

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962)

TAYLOR
KAYSEN
BELK
R. JOHNSON
DUNGAN

RETAIN OR DESTROY

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7006

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER (C) WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS, FROM TRAN VAN LY.

1. ON 25 JANUARY 1962, TRAN VAN LY, OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-6999 (TDCS-3/500,042) BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POLITICAL ADVISOR TO GENERAL NGHIEM.) SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC).

2. LY SAID THAT HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. LY WAS AWARE THAT CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO MOUNT A

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EXO

VTF AID

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. LY BELIEVED THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. (FIELD COMMENT. TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF FVS-5908 (CS-3/474,755) HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED SUPPORT TO DIEM BY THE U.S. A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTED THAT, WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT DIEM.)

3. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. LY'S SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SEIGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

4. IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LY TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON LY'S PART IN RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER LY IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)

6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE